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THE DETERMINACY OF INFINITE GAMES WITH EVENTUAL
PERFECT MONITORING
ERAN SHMAYA
Abstract. An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the
opponent’s actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are
played, is determined. The proof relies on a representation of the game as a stochastic
game with perfect information, in which Chance operates as a delegate for the players and
performs the randomizations for them, and on Martin’s Theorem about determinacy of such
games.
1. Setup
Consider an infinite two-player zero-sum game that is given by a triple
(
A, (Pn)n∈N ,W
)
where A is a finite set of actions, Pn is a partition of A
n for every n ∈ N, the information
partition of stage n, and W ⊆ AN is a Borel set, the winning set of player 1. The game is
played in stages: player 1 chooses an action a0 ∈ A; then player 2 chooses an action a1 ∈ A;
then player 1 chooses an action a2 ∈ A, and so on, ad infinitum. Before choosing an, the
player who plays at stage n receives some information about the actions of previous stages:
Let h = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1) be the finite history that consists of the actions played before stage
n; then before choosing an, the player who plays at stage n observes the atom of Pn that
contains h. Player 1 wins the game if the infinite history (a0, a1, . . . ) is in W . When the
action set and information partitions are fixed, I denote the game by Γ(W ).
A behavioral strategy x = (xn)n∈N of player 1 is a sequence {xn : Pn → ∆(A)}n=0,2,4,...
of functions: At stage n, after observing the finite history h = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1), player 1
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randomizes his action according to xn(πn(h)), where πn(h) is the atom of Pn that contains
h. Abusing notations, I sometimes write xn(h) instead of xn(πn(h)). Behavioral strategies y
of player 2 are defined analogously.
Every pair x, y of strategies induces a probability distribution µx,y over the set A
N of
infinite histories or plays : µx,y is the joint distribution of a sequence α0, α1, . . . . . . of A-
valued random variables such that
(1) P (αn = a |α0, . . . , αn−1 ) =


xn(α0, . . . , αn−1)[a], if n is even,
yn(α0, . . . , αn−1)[a], if n is odd.
I call such a sequence of random variables an (x, y)-random play. If the players play according
to the strategy profile (x, y), then the expected payoff for player 1 is given by
(2) µx,y(W ) = P ((α0, α1, . . . ) ∈ W ) ,
where α0, α1, . . . is an (x, y)-random play.
The lower value val Γ(W ) and upper value val Γ(W ) of the game Γ(W ) are defined by:
val Γ(W ) = sup
x
inf
y
µx,y(W ), and val Γ(W ) = inf
y
sup
x
µx,y(W ),
where the suprema are taken over all strategies x of player 1 and the infima over all strategies
y of player 2. The game is determined if the lower and upper values are equal, val Γ(W ) =
val Γ(W ), in which case their common value is called the value of the game. For ǫ ≥ 0, a
strategy x of player 1 is ǫ-optimal if µx,y(W ) ≥ val Γ(W )− ǫ for every strategy y of player
2. We also say that player 1 can guarantee payoff of at least val Γ(W )− ǫ by playing such a
strategy x. ǫ-optimal strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
Let ∼n be the equivalence relation over infinite histories such that u ∼n u
′ whenever u|n
and u′|n belong to the same atom of Pn, where u|n and u
′|n are the initial segments of u
and u′ of length n. The interpretation is that if u, u′ ∈ AN and u ∼n u
′, then at stage n
the player cannot distinguish between u and u′. Say that at stage n the player observes the
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action of stage m if, for every pair of infinite histories u = (a0, a1, . . . ) and u
′ = (a′0, a
′
1, . . . ),
u ∼n u
′ implies am = a
′
m.
1.1. Definition. The information partitions (Pn)n≥0 satisfy perfect recall if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) Players know their own actions: at stage n the player observes the action of stage
n− 2.
(2) Players do not forget information: if u, u′ ∈ AN and u ∼n+2 u
′ then u ∼n u
′.
The setup of infinite games with perfect recall is general enough to subsume two cases
which have been extensively studied:
Gale-Stewart games. If, at every stage n, players observe previous actions of their op-
ponents, then the game is called a Gale-Stewart game or a game with perfect information.
Gale and Stewart [4] proved that such games are determined if the winning set W is closed
(or open) and asked whether the result can be extended to more complex winning sets. In
a seminal paper, Martin [8] proved that the game is determined for every Borel winning set
W . Gale-Stewart games admit pure 0-optimal strategies, and the value is 0 or 1. Moreover,
Gale-Stewart games with an infinite action set A and Borel winning set are also determined.
Blackwell games. Assume that at even stages n = 2k, player 1 observes the actions of
stages 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1, and at odd stages n = 2k + 1, player 2 observes the actions of stages
0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1 (his own actions and all the previous actions of his opponent except for
the last one), and that the information partitions are the roughest partitions that satisfy
these conditions. This essentially means that the players choose actions simultaneously and
independently at stages 2k and 2k+ 1, and then both actions are made public. Such games
are called Blackwell games. Blackwell [1, 2] proved the determinacy of Blackwell games
(which he called “infinite games with imperfect information”) with a Gδ winning set, and
conjectured that every Blackwell game with a Borel winning set is determined. Vervoort [15]
advanced higher in the Borel hierarchy, proving determinacy of games with Gδσ winning sets.
Blackwell’s conjecture was proved by Martin in 1998 [9].
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Gale-Stewart games and Blackwell games differ in the timing of monitoring – the obser-
vation of the opponent’s actions: whereas in Gale-Stewart games monitoring is immediate,
in Blackwell games player 2’s monitoring is delayed by one stage. Both setups satisfy a
property that I call eventual perfect monitoring, which means that the entire history of the
game is known to every player at infinity. One example of eventual perfect monitoring, of
which Blackwell games are a special case, is delayed monitoring, introduced by Scarf and
Shapley [12], when the action of stage m is monitored after some lag dm. But the setup of
games with eventual perfect monitoring is more general than the setup of games with delayed
monitoring. First, the former setup allows the length of the lag to depend on the history of
the games. Second, it allows the information to be revealed in pieces; for example, a player
can observe some function of the previous actions of his opponent before he observes the
actions themselves.
1.2. Definition. The information partitions {Pn}n∈N satisfy eventual perfect monitoring if
for every u, u′ ∈ AN such that u 6= u′, there exists an n such that u ≁k u
′ for every k > n.
The purpose of this paper is to prove the following theorem.
1.3. Theorem. Let Γ = (A, (Pn)n≥0,W ) be an infinite game with a finite action set, a Borel
winning set, perfect recall, and eventual perfect monitoring. Then Γ is determined.
The proof of the theorem relies on the stochastic extension of Martin’s theorem about
the determinacy of Blackwell games. However, except for the simple case in which the
stages are divided into blocks and previous actions are monitored at the end of each block,
I was unable to find an immediate reduction of the eventual perfect monitoring setup to
the Blackwell games setup, nor was able to adapt Martin’s proof to the eventual perfect
monitoring setup. The difficulty stems from the fact that Martin’s proof uses the existence
of proper subgames – occurrences along the play path where the current partial history is
commonly known. However, even under simple monitoring structures, such as when one
4
player observes opponent’s action with two periods delay, the game does not have proper
subgames.
Infinite games with Borel winning sets have recently been used in economics literature
on testing the quality of probabilistic predictions. Consider a forecaster who claims to
know the probability distribution that governs some stochastic process. To prove his claim,
the forecaster provides probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector tests the
forecaster’s reliability using the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the forecaster
and the observed realization of the process. Using Martin’s Theorem about the determinacy
of Blackwell games, I proved [13] that any inspection which is based on predictions about
the next-day realization of the process is manipulable, i.e., it can be strategically passed
by a charlatan. Theorem 1.3 of this paper can be used to prove that inspections based on
daily predictions about an arbitrarily long finite horizon are also manipulable [13, Section
5]. On the other hand, Olszewski and Sandroni [10] gave an example for a non-manipulable
inspection which is based on prediction about the infinite future. Such an inspection relies
on a game without eventual perfect monitoring.
In Section 2 I give some examples of games with and without eventual perfect monitoring.
In Section 3 I prove the determinacy of infinite games with perfect recall and a compact
winning set; this result is used in the proof of Theorem 1.3. The proof of the theorem is in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the role of eventual perfect monitoring in the proof. Section 6
discusses some open questions. Martin’s Theorem is reviewed in the appendix.
2. Endurance games
All the examples in this section have the same action set and the same winning set. The
action set is A = {S,L}: At every stage, each player decides whether to Stay or Leave the
game. Once a player leaves, his future actions do not affect the outcome of the game. For an
infinite history u = (a0, a1, . . . ), let n
1(u) = min {n even |an = L} be the (possibly infinite)
first stage in which player 1 left the game, and let n2(u) be the first stage in which player 2
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left. Let
(3) W =
{
u ∈ AN
∣∣(n2(u) < n1(u) <∞) or (n1(u) <∞ and n2(u) =∞)}
be the winning set of player 1. The game models a ‘last man standing’ endurance contest,
as in a college drinking game or religious conflicts: Player 1 wants to leave the game at some
point, but he doesn’t want to be the first to leave.
In Example 2.1 both players have eventual perfect monitoring. In Example 2.2 none of the
players has eventual perfect monitoring. In Example 2.3 only player 1 has eventual perfect
monitoring.
2.1. Example. Let k be a positive integer. Assume that at stage n each player observes his
own actions and the actions of his opponent at stages smaller than n− k. Then the value of
the game is 0. An optimal strategy for player 2 is to play S as long as he is not informed that
player 1 has played L. When player 2 knows that player 1 played L at some point, player 2
then plays L.
Note that in the previous example, the number k need not be constant. It can depend on
the stage number, and can differ between the players. As long as player 2 knows the actions
of his opponent eventually, the game is determined and the value is 0. (The independence
of the value on the information partitions in this example is not typical)
2.2. Example. Assume that each player knows his own previous actions, but does not
observe his opponent’s actions. Then the game is not determined. In fact, val Γ = 0 and
val Γ = 1.
2.3. Example. Assume that player 1 observes the past actions of player 2, but player 2
doesn’t observe the past actions of player 1. Then the game is not determined. In fact,
val Γ = 1/2 and val Γ = 1. An optimal strategy for player 1 is: At stage 0 play L or S with
probability 1/2, and, at stage 2k for k ≥ 1, play the action of player 2 from stage 2k − 1.
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3. Games with a compact winning set
The set AN of plays is naturally endowed with the product topology. In this section I prove
the special case of Theorem 1.3 for compact winning sets. The determinacy follows from
perfect recall alone. The proof uses two standard results from game theory: the Minimax
Theorem for normal form games and Kuhn’s Theorem.
Recall that a normal form game is given by a triple (Σ,Θ, R) where Σ and Θ are Borel
spaces of pure strategies for players 1 and 2, and R : Σ×Θ→ [0, 1] is a Borel payoff function.
A mixed strategy ξ of player 1 is a probability distribution over Σ. Mixed strategies τ of
player 2 are defined analogously. The mixed extension of the normal form game (Σ,Θ, r) is
determined if
sup
ξ∈∆(Σ)
inf
θ∈Θ
∫
R(σ, θ)ξ(dσ) = inf
τ∈∆(Θ)
sup
σ∈Σ
∫
R(σ, θ)τ(dθ).
It follows from Fan’s Minimax Theorem [3, Theorem 2] that if Σ is a compact topological
space and the function R(·, θ) is upper semicontinuous for every θ ∈ Θ, then the mixed
extension of the normal form game (Σ,Θ, R) is determined.
Let Γ = (A, {Pn}n∈N,W ) be an infinite game with perfect recall. The normal form of Γ
is the normal form game N(Γ) = (Σ,Θ, R) defined as follows. A pure strategy σ ∈ Σ of
player 1 is a sequence {σn : Pn → A}n even of functions: at stage n, after the finite history
h = (h0, h1, . . . , hn−1) was played, player 1 plays σn(πn(h)), where πn(h) is the atom of Pn
that contains h. Pure strategies θ of player 2 are defined analogously. Every pair σ, θ of
pure strategies of players 1 and 2 determines an infinite history u(σ, θ) = (a0, a1, . . . ) that is
given by
an =


σn (πn (a0, . . . , an−1)) , for even n,
θn (πn (a0, . . . , an−1)) , for odd n.
The payoff function of N(Γ) is R(σ, θ) = 1W (u(σ, θ)). Kuhn’s Theorem [14, Theorem D.1]
states the equivalence between mixed strategies and behavioral strategies in games with
perfect recall. In particular, the game Γ is determined if and only if its normal form game
N(Γ) is determined.
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3.1. Lemma. An infinite game with a finite action set, perfect recall, and a compact winning
set is determined.
Proof. Let Γ = (A, {Pn}n∈N,W ) be an infinite game with a finite action set A, perfect recall,
and a compact winning set W . By Kuhn’s Theorem it is sufficient to prove that the normal
form game N(Γ) = (Σ,Θ, R) of Γ is determined. This follows from the minimax theorem.
Indeed, the set Σ of pure strategies of player 1 is compact in the product topology, and
the payoff function R is upper semicontinuous as a composition of the continuous function
(σ, θ) 7→ u(σ, θ) and the function 1W , which is upper semi continuous because W is closed.

4. Proof of Theorem 1.3
Throughout this section, we fixe a game Γ that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.3.
Overview of the proof. Eventual perfect monitoring entails that the action of stage m
is known to the opponent at infinity. Lemma 4.1 below shows that in fact more is true:
for every m there exists some finite stage n > m at which, regardless of the play path, the
opponent knows the action of stage m. This means that at such a stage n the action taken by
the player at stage m becomes common knowledge: The opponent knows the action played
at stage m, the player that played the action knows that the opponent knows, the opponent
knows that the player that play the action knows that the opponent knows, ad infinitum.
Roughly speaking, I am going to construct a stochastic game Γ∗ with perfect information
that mimics the original game Γ. In Γ∗, at every stage m, the player announces a mixture
over the set A of actions contingent on his information at that stage. So in Γ∗, instead of
choosing an action which is not revealed to his opponent (as in Γ), the player announces how
he intends to randomize his action. The actual randomization is performed by Chance at a
future stage k(m), in which the action should become commonly known, and the realization
of that randomization is immediately made public. So in the game Γ∗, Chance performs the
randomization for the player. The determinacy of Γ∗ follows from Martin’s Theorem, and I
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prove that the value of Γ∗ is also the value of the original game Γ. For this purpose I have to
show that the fact that in Γ∗ the player announces his randomization plan cannot be used
by the opponent to change the payoff in the game. This step, which is the core of the proof,
uses approximations of the winning set by compact sets, and the fact that by Lemma 3.1
the original game Γ is determined when the winning set is compact.
Since the sets of actions must be finite for Martin’s Theorem to apply, I first prove that
every behavioral strategy in Γ can be approximated by a behavioral strategy in which all
the mixtures are taken from some finite sets. This is done in Lemma 4.2. Because of the
approximation argument, the stochastic game Γ∗ that is constructed in the proof depends
on an additional parameter ǫ which corresponds to the level of approximation.
Preliminaries. Let A<N =
⋃
n∈NA
n be the set of finite histories of the game. For a finite
history h ∈ An, the length of h is given by length(h) = n. For an infinite history u =
(a0, a1, a2, . . . ) ∈ A
N and n ∈ N, let u|n = (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ A
<N be the initial segment of u
of length n. Similarly, for a finite history h ∈ A<N and n < length(h), let h|n be the initial
segment of h of length n.
4.1. Lemma. For every m ∈ N there exists an n > m such that n 6= m mod 2 and
such that at stage n the opponent observes the action of stage m, i.e., for every pair u =
(a0, a1, . . . ), u
′ = (a′0, a
′
1, . . . ) of infinite histories u ∼n u
′ implies am = a
′
m.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that m is odd. Let a ∈ A, and let Ca = {u = (u0, u1, . . . ) ∈ A
N|um =
a}. Then Ca and C
c
a are compact. Let Ta ⊆ A
<N be the set of all finite histories h of even
length n such that π−1n (h
′) ∩ Ca 6= ∅ and π
−1
n (h
′) ∩ Cca 6= ∅, where πk(h) is the atom of Pk
that contains h.
It follows from the perfect recall assumption that Ta is a tree over A
2. I claim that
Ta is well-founded. Indeed, if v is an infinite branch of Ta, then
⋂
n≥m π
−1
n (v|n) ∩ Ca and⋂
n≥m π
−1
n (v|n) ∩ C
c
a are nonempty as the intersections of decreasing sequences of compact
sets. Let u = (u0, u1, . . . ) ∈
⋂
n≥m π
−1
n (v|n)∩Ca and u
′ = (u′0, u
′
1, . . . ) ∈
⋂
n≥m π
−1
n (v|n)∩C
c
a.
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Then um = a 6= u
′
m and therefore u 6= u
′, but u ∼n u
′ for every n, in contradiction to the
eventual perfect monitoring assumption.
By Ko¨nig’s Lemma, Ta is finite. Let n
a be the maximal length of elements of Ta, and let
n = max{na|a ∈ A} + 1. Then from stage n onwards the opponent observes the action of
stage m. 
Approximating strategies. For two strategies x, x′ of player 1, let d(x, x′), the distance
between x and x′, be given by
d(x, x′) =
∑
n even
max
p∈Pn
‖xn(p)− x
′
n(p)‖1,
where the maximum is taken over all atoms p of Pn. The distance d(y, y
′) between two
behavioral strategies y, y′ of player 2 is defined analogously.
4.2. Lemma. Let x, x′ be strategies of player 1 and y, y′ be strategies of player 2. Then
‖µx,y(W )− µx′,y′(W )‖ ≤
(
d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)
)
/2
for every Borel subset W of AN.
Proof. The idea is to join a (x, y)-random play and a (x′, y′)-random play such that the
two random plays are equal with high probability. Let zn : Pn → A be given by zn = xn
for even n’s and zn = yn for odd n’s and z
′
n : Pn → A be given by z
′
n = x
′
n for even n’s
and z′n = y
′
n for odd n’s. Let α0, α
′
0, α1, α
′
1, . . . be a sequence of A-valued random variables
defined inductively such that the conditional joint distribution of the pair (αn, α
′
n) given the
event {αi = ai, α
′
i = a
′
i for 0 ≤ i < n} satisfies
P (αn = a |αi = ai, α
′
i = a
′
i for 0 ≤ i < n) = zn(a0, . . . , an−1)[a],(4)
P (α′n = a
′ |αi = ai, α
′
i = a
′
i for 0 ≤ i < n) = z
′
n(a
′
0, . . . , a
′
n−1)[a
′], and(5)
P (α′n 6= αn |αi = ai, α
′
i = a
′
i for 0 ≤ i < n) ≤ ‖zn(a0, . . . , an−1)− z
′
n(a
′
0, . . . , a
′
n−1)‖1/2,(6)
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for every n and every a0, a
′
0, . . . , an−1, a
′
n−1 ∈ A. The existence of random variables αn, α
′
n
with the prescribed conditional distribution follows from a standard coupling argument [5,
Theorem 5.2]. From (4) it follows that
P (αn = a |αi = ai for 0 ≤ i < n) = zn(a0, . . . , an−1)[a]
for every n and every a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ A, i.e., that α0, α1, . . . is an (x, y)-random play of Γ(W ).
Similarly, from (5) it follows that α′0, α
′
1, . . . is a (x
′, y′)-random play of Γ(W ). From (6) it
follows that
P (αn 6= α
′
n |αi = α
′
i for 0 ≤ i < n) ≤ max
p∈Pn
‖zn(p)− z
′
n(p)‖1/2.
Therefore,
P (αn 6= α
′
n for some n) ≤
∑
n∈N
P (αn 6= α
′
n |αi = α
′
i for 0 ≤ i < n)
≤
∑
n
max
p∈Pn
‖zn(p)− z
′
n(p)‖1/2 =
(
d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)
)
/2.
The assertion follows from the last inequality and the fact that µx,y and µx′,y′ are the distri-
butions of α0, α1, . . . and α
′
0, α
′
1, . . . , respectively. 
4.3. Corollary. Let ∆ǫ,n be a finite set which is ǫ/2
n-dense in ∆(A) endowed with ‖‖1, i.e.,
such that the ǫ/2n-balls around elements of ∆ǫ,n cover ∆(A). Then there exists an ǫ-optimal
strategy y for player 2 in Γ(W ) such that yn(p) ∈ ∆ǫ,n(A) for every odd n and every atom p
of Pn.
Proof. Let y′ be an ǫ/2-optimal strategy of player 2 in Γ(W ) and let y be a strategy of player
2 such that ‖yn(p)− y
′
n(p)‖1 < ǫ/2
n and yn(p) ∈ ∆ǫ,n(A) for every odd n and every atom p
of Pn. Then d(y, y
′) < ǫ, and therefore,
µx,y(W ) ≤ µx,y′(W ) + ǫ/2 ≤ valΓ(W ) + ǫ
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for every strategy x of player 1, where the first inequality follows from Lemma 4.2, and the
second inequality from the fact that y′ is ǫ/2-optimal. Therefore y is ǫ-optimal. 
Chance as the players’ randomization delegate. Let Γ = (A, Pn,W ) be an infinite
game with perfect recall and eventual perfect monitoring. In this section, I define an auxiliary
stochastic game Γ∗ǫ = Γ
∗
ǫ (W ) with perfect information, which mimics the original game Γ.
Fix ǫ > 0 and, for every n ∈ N, let ∆ǫ,n be a finite subset of the interior of ∆(A) which is
ǫ/2n-dense in ∆(A) endowed with ‖‖1. For every m ∈ N, fix k(m) > m such that m 6= k(m)
mod 2, and such that at stage k(m) the opponent observes the action of stage m, as in
Lemma 4.1.
For every n, let Bn = {b : Pn → ∆ǫ,n} be the set of actions of stage n in Γ
∗
ǫ(W ), so that
an action is a function from Pn (viewed as a collection of atoms) to ∆ǫ,n; and let Sn = A
Kn
be the set of states of stage n in Γ∗ǫ(W ), where Kn = {m|k(m) = n}. Let fn : A
n → Sn be
the projection over the corresponding coordinates m ∈ Kn, and let F : S0 × S1 · · · → A
N be
such that
(7) F (f0(u|0), f1(u|1), . . . ) = u
for every u ∈ AN.
Γ∗ǫ(W ) is played as follows: Player 1 plays at even stages and player 2 at odd stages. At
every stage n, Chance announces a state sn in Sn, and then the player that play at that stage
announces an action bn in Bn. Chance chooses the state sn of stage n from the distribution
z (s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1) that is given by
(8) z (s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1) [s] =
P (fn (α¯0, . . . , α¯n−1) = s |fk(α¯0, . . . α¯k−1) = sk for 0 ≤ k < n− 1) ,
where α¯0, . . . , α¯n is a sequence of A-valued random variables such that
(9) P (α¯k = a |α¯0, . . . , α¯k−1 ) = bk (πk(α¯0, . . . , α¯k−1))[a].
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A pure strategy of player 1 in Γ∗ǫ(W ) is a sequence {x
∗
n : S0×B0×· · ·×Sn−1×Bn−1×Sn →
Bn}n=0,2,... of functions: at stage n, after observing the finite history (s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1, sn),
player 1 plays x∗ (s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1, sn). Pure strategies y
∗ of Player 2 are defined anal-
ogously. Let X∗ and Y ∗ be the sets of pure strategies of players 1 and 2 respectively. The
expected payoff for player 1 in the game Γ∗ǫ (W ) when the players play according to (x
∗, y∗)
is given by R(x∗, y∗) = P (F (ζ0, ζ1, . . . ) ∈ W ) where ζ0, β0, ζ1, β1, . . . is a sequence of random
variables, where the values of βn are in Bn and the values of ζn are in Sn such that
P (ζn = s |ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1 ) = z (ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1) [s],
βn = x
∗
n (ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1, ζn) for even n, and
βn = y
∗
n (ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1, ζn) for odd n.
I call such a sequence ζ0, β0, ζ1, β1, . . . of random variables an (x
∗, y∗)-random play of Γ∗ǫ(W ).
Identifying the game Γ∗ǫ (W ) with its normal form, say that Γ
∗
ǫ(W ) is determined if
sup
ξ∈∆(X∗)
inf
y∗∈Y ∗
∫
R(x∗, y∗)ξ(dx∗) = inf
τ∈∆(Y ∗)
sup
x∗∈X∗
∫
R(x∗, y∗)τ(dy∗).
In this case the common value of the two sides of the last equations is called the value of
the game, and is denoted by val Γ∗ǫ(W ).
4.4. Lemma. Let W ⊆ AN be a Borel set. Then the game Γ∗ǫ (W ) is determined, and
val Γ∗ǫ (W0) > val Γ
∗
ǫ(W )− ǫ for some compact subset W0 of W .
Proof. In the terminology of appendix A, the game Γ∗ǫ(W ) is the stochastic game with
stochastic setup S = ((Sn, Bn)n∈N, z) and the winning set η
−1(W ), where η : S0×B0×S1×
B1 × · · · → A
N is the continuous map given by
(10) η (s0, b0, s1, b1, . . . ) = F (s0, s1, . . . ).
Thus η−1(W ) is a Borel set and therefore by Proposition A.1 the game (S, η−1(W )) is
determined. Moreover, there exists a compact set C ⊆ S0 × B0 × S1 × B1 × . . . such that
C ⊆ η−1(W ) and val(S, C) > val(S, η−1(W )) − ǫ. Let W0 = η(C). Then W0 is a compact
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subset of W and val(S, η−1(W0)) ≥ val(S, C) > val(S, η
−1(W ))−ǫ, since η−1(W0) ⊇ C. The
assertion follows from the fact that the games (S, η−1(W0)) and (S, η
−1(W )) are Γ∗ǫ (W0) and
Γ∗ǫ(W ), respectively. 
The following lemma says that, up to ǫ, player 2 can guarantee in Γ∗ǫ the same amount he
can guarantee in Γ.
4.5. Lemma. For every Borel set W of AN,
val Γ∗ǫ (W )− ǫ ≤ val Γ(W ).
Proof. Note first that by definition of Kn and from the perfect recall assumption, there exist
functions gn,k : Pn → Sk for every n and every k ≤ n such that
(11) gn,k(πn(a0, . . . , an−1)) = fk(a0, . . . , ak−1)
for every h = (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ A
n and where πn : A
n → Pn is the natural projection.
Let y be an ǫ-optimal behavioral strategy for player 2 in Γ(W ) such that yn(p) ∈ ∆ǫ,n(A)
for every odd n and every atom p of Pn. The existence of such a strategy y follows
from Corollary 4.3. Consider a pure strategy y∗ of player 2 in Γ∗ǫ(W ) that is given by
y∗n(s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1, sn) = yn for every odd n and every partial history (s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1, sn)
of Γ∗ǫ (W ). (Thus, in every odd stage n, player 2’s action is yn, regardless of the history.) Let
x∗ be any strategy of player 1 in Γ∗ǫ . Let x be the behavioral strategy of player 1 in Γ(W )
that is given by
xn(p) = x
∗
n(s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1, sn)(p),
where (s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1, sn) is the finite history of Γ
∗
ǫ(W ) defined inductively by bk =
x∗k (s0, b0, . . . , sk−1, bk−1, sk) for even k, bk = yk for odd k, and sk = gn,k(p).
I am going to join an (x, y)-random play of Γ(W ) and an (x∗, y∗)-random play of Γ∗ǫ(W )
with equal payoffs. Let Π0, ζ0, β0, α0,Π1, ζ1, β1, α1, . . . be a sequence of random variables
such that the values of ζn are in Sn, the values of βn are in Bn, and the values of αn are in
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A, and such that
ζn = fn (α0, . . . , αn−1) ,(12)
βn = x
∗
n (ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1, ζn) for even n,(13)
βn = y
∗
n (ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1, ζn) for odd n, and(14)
P (αn = a |α0, . . . , αn−1 ) = βn (Πn) [a].(15)
From (11) and (12) it follows that
(16) ζk = gn,k (πn (α0, . . . , αn−1))
for every n and every k ≤ n. From (14) and the definition of y∗, it follows that βn = yn for
every odd n. In particular,
(17) yn(πn (α0, . . . , αn−1)) = βn(πn (α0, . . . , αn−1))
for every odd n. From (13), the definition of x, (16), and the fact that βk = yk for every odd
k, it follows that
(18) xn (πn (α0, . . . , αn−1)) = βn (πn (α0, . . . , αn−1))
for every even n. From (15), (17), (18), it follows that
P (αn = a |α0, . . . , αn−1 ) =


xn(πn(α0, . . . , αn−1)), n even,
yn(πn(α0, . . . , αn−1)) n odd,
i.e., that α0, α1, . . . is an (x, y)-random play of Γ(W ).
From (12),(13),(14),(15), and (8), it follows that
(19) P(ζn = sn|ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1) = z (ζ0, β0, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1) [sn].
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Indeed, given the event {ζ0 = s0, β0 = b0, . . . , ζn−1 = sn−1, βn−1 = bn−1}, the conditional
distribution of α0, . . . , αn−1 is like the conditional distribution of a sequence α¯0, . . . , α¯n−1
that satisfies (9) given that fk(α¯0) = sk for k < n. (Here I use the fact that βn is measurable
with respect to ζ0, . . . , ζn.)
From (19),(13), and (14) it follows that ζ0, β0, ζ1, β1, . . . is an (x
∗, y∗)-random play of
Γǫ(W ). Therefore, the expected payoff for player 1 in Γ
∗
ǫ (W ) under (x
∗, y∗) is
P (F (ζ0, ζ1, . . . ) ∈ W ) = P ((α0, α1, . . . ) ∈ W ) = µx,y(W ) ≤ val Γ(W ) + ǫ,
where the first equality follows from (7) and (12), the second equality from (2), and the
inequality from the fact that y is ǫ-optimal.
Summing up, I have provided a pure strategy y∗ of player 2 in Γ∗ǫ(W ) (namely, play
y1, y3, . . . ) that gives expected payoff of at most val Γ(W ) + ǫ against any pure strategy x
∗
of player 1 in Γ∗ǫ (W ). Therefore, val Γ
∗
ǫ(W ) ≤ val Γ(W ) + ǫ. 
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Consider the stochastic game Γ∗ǫ (W ) defined above. Let W0 be
a compact subset of W such that val Γ∗ǫ(W0) > val Γ
∗
ǫ (W )− ǫ, and whose existence follows
from Lemma 4.4. Then
val Γ(W ) ≥ val Γ(W0) = val Γ(W0) ≥ val Γ
∗
ǫ (W0)− ǫ > val Γ
∗
ǫ(W )− 2ǫ,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that W ⊇W0, the first equality follows from
Lemma 3.1, the second inequality follows from Lemma 4.5, and the third inequality follows
from the choice of W0.
Similarly, for player 2 we get val Γ(W ) < val Γ∗ǫ(W ) + 2ǫ. It follows that val Γ(W ) <
val Γ(W ) + 4ǫ. Since ǫ was arbitrary, it follows that val Γ(W ) = val Γ(W ). 
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5. The role of eventual perfect monitoring
In the auxiliary game that I use in the proof of Theorem 1.3, Chance plays the role of
the players ‘randomization delegate’, and all the actions of the players are perfectly mon-
itored. What happens if we try to apply the same argument to a game without eventual
perfect monitoring ? Consider the following game, which is a modification of the game in
Example 2.3 with Chance as player 1’s randomization delegate.
5.1. Example. Let A = {S,L} and consider the game with perfect monitoring that is played
in stages n = 0, 1, . . . as follows: Player 1 plays at even stages and player 2 plays at odd
stages. At every even stage n player 1 declares a mixed action pn ∈ [0, 1], viewed as a dice
over A (pn is the probability that player 1 will leave the game at stage n if he didn’t stop
already). At every odd stage n player 2 declares an action A = {S,L}. At infinity, Chance
tosses the dice that player 1 declared one after another, thus obtaining an infinite history
h ∈ A∞. Player 1 wins the game if h ∈ W , where W is given by (3).
Unlike the original game of Example 2.3, the game of Example 5.1 is determined and has
value 1/2. An optimal strategy for player 2 is to leave the game at the first stage n for which
(1− p0) · (1 − p2) · · · · · (1− pn−1) < 1/2. However, as we saw, in the game of Example 2.3,
where player 1’s action is not monitored by player 2, player 2 cannot guarantee to pay a
payoff smaller than 1.
So, the transition from imperfect monitoring to Chance acting as the player’s randomiza-
tion delegate might fundamentally change the strategic potential of game in the absence of
eventual perfect monitoring. On the other hand, in games with eventual perfect monitoring,
as with finite games, a player does not lose anything if he declares his mixed contingent plan
and let Chance do the randomization for him.
The idea that a player declares his contingent mixed plan and let Chance randomize for him
can be traced back to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s discussion of mixed actions. They
argue that a player who fears his plan will be found out or deduced by the opponent may
want to use randomization. When the player let Chance choose his action, the opponent
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cannot possibly find out what the action is going to be, since the player does not know
it himself. “Ignorance is obviously a very good safeguard against disclosing information
directly or indirectly” [16, Section 17.2.1] The fact that the game is determined shows that
the player who follows the Founders’ advice does not lose anything if his plan is indeed found
out, so he might as well declare it. In the proof of Theorem 1.3 we walked the reverse path:
Determinacy follows from the fact that a player does not lose anything if he declares his
contingent plan. Example 5.1 shows that the argument relies on the assumption of eventual
perfect monitoring.
6. Open questions
The following questions about possible extensions of Theorem 1.3 are interesting for their
own sake, and also because they highlight the assumptions on the game that were used in
the proof of Theorem 1.3.
The first question is about relaxing eventual perfect monitoring. Say that an infinite game
Γ = (A, (Pn)n≥0,W ) admits eventual outcome monitoring if both players know the identity
of the winner (that is, the outcome of the game) at infinity. Formally, this means that for
every u, u′ ∈ AN such that u ∈ W and u′ /∈ W , there exists an n such that u ≁k u
′ for every
k > n.
Question. Is every game with perfect recall and eventual outcome monitoring determined
?
The construction of the auxiliary game Γ∗ in the proof of Theorem 1.3 relies on Lemma 4.1,
that if both players know the play path at infinity then each action becomes commonly known
at some finite time, and so the play path in Γ can be reconstructed from Chance’s actions
in Γ∗. However, when both players know the occurrence of W at infinity, it still needs not
be the case that W depends only on things that are commonly known at some finite times.
The second questions relates to general payoff functions. Assume that the game is played
as in Section 1, and at infinity player 2 pays player 1 the amount f(a0, a1, . . . ), where
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f : AN → [0, 1] is a Borel function, the payoff function of the game. The games studied
in this paper are a special case, where f = 1W is an indicator function. The definition
of determinacy for games with Borel payoff function is a straightforward extension of the
definition in Section 1.
Question. Is every game with eventual perfect monitoring and general payoff function de-
termined ?
In the proof of Theorem 1.3 we approximated the winning setW from below by a closed set,
and used Lemma 3.1 that games with closed winning sets are determined. Lemma 3.1 and
its proof hold for upper semi-continuous payoff functions. However, upper semi-continuous
functions are not sufficient to approximate arbitrary payoff functions in Martin’s Theorem
about Blackwell Games. (one needs to use Gδ-functions [9, p. 1576, Remark (c)]).
One can also combine the two questions: What about game with general payoff function,
perfect recall and eventual payoff monitoring (i.e., for every histories u, u′ ∈ AN such that
f(u) 6= f(u′) there exists an n such that u ≁k u
′ for every k > n) ? In this case the game
needs not be determined. Indeed, Rosenberg and Vieille give an example of a non-determined
recursive game with incomplete information on one side [11, Section 4.1, henceforth RV]. To
modify RV’s game to an infinite game with eventual payoff monitoring, replace Nature’s
randomization in RV’s game with two stages in which player 1 and then player 2 choose a
bit from {0, 1} and the sum of these bits modulo 2 is the state of nature. Player 1’s initial
choice is not monitored by player 2, but player 2’s choice is monitored by player 1 so that
player 1 knows the state of nature. Then the game proceeds as in RV’s game until there
is an absorption, in which case player 2 is notified of the initial bit chosen by player 1. If
there is no absorption then at infinity player 2 will not know the initial bit of player 1, but
will know that the payoff is 0. Since by choosing his initial bit uniformly every player can
guarantee that the sum modulo 2 is uniform, the indeterminacy of RV’s game implies the
indeterminacy of the modified game.
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Appendix A. Martin’s Theorem for Stochastic Games
In this section I formulate Martin’s Theorem about the determinacy of stochastic games.
The stochastic game used in this paper has complete information, while Martin studied a
more general setup in which the players play simultaneously. Note, however, that Martin’s
older theorem about the determinacy of Gale-Stewart games [8] is not sufficient for my
purposes because of the presence of Chance.
A stochastic game with perfect information is given by ((Sn, Bn)n∈N, z, V ), where B0, B1, . . .
are finite sets of actions, S0, S1, . . . are finite sets of states or Chance’s actions, z = {zn :
S0×B0×· · ·×Sn−1×Bn−1 → ∆(Sn)} is Chance’s strategy, and V ⊆ S0×B0×S1×B1× . . .
is the winning set of Player 1.
The game is played as follows: Player 1 plays at even stages and player 2 at odd stages.
At every stage n, Chance announces a state sn in Sn, and then the player that plays at
that stage announces an action bn in Bn. Chance chooses the state sn of stage n from the
distribution z(s0, b0, . . . , sn−1, bn−1). Player 1 wins the game if (s0, b0, s1, b1, . . . ) ∈ V .
I call a triple S = ((Sn, Bn)n∈N, z, ) of action sets, states sets, and Chance’s strategy a
stochastic setup. So the stochastic games that I use in this paper are given by a stochastic
setup S = ((Sn, Bn)n∈N, z}) and a winning set V ⊆ S0 ×B0 × S1 × B1 × . . . .
The definitions of strategies of the players, and of determinacy and value of the game, are
omitted.
The following proposition was proved by Martin [9]. For the stochastic extension, see
Maitra and Sudderth’s paper [7]. The fact that the lower value of the game can be ap-
proximated by the value on some compact subset was proved earlier by Maitra, Purves and
Sudderth [6].
A.1. Proposition. Let S = ((Sn, Bn)n∈N, z}) be a stochastic setup, and let V be a Borel
subset of S0 × B0 × S1 ×B1 × . . . . Then:
(1) The game (S, V ) is determined.
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(2) For every ǫ > 0, there exists a compact subset C of V such that
val (S, C) > val (S, V )− ǫ.
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